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Abstract 
The preparation procedure, an undefined notion in quantum theory, has not had the relevance that it 
deserves in the interpretation of quantum mechanical formalism. Here we utilize the concepts of identical 
and similar preparation procedures to show the conceptual differences between the statistical and the 
conventional interpretation of quantum formalism. Although the statistical understanding, and its final 
logical consequence, hidden variables theories (this connexion being explained in the text), have a great 
intuitive appeal due to its fewer ontological difficulties, both recent experimental results and theoretical 
developments seem to support an epistemic alternative closer to the conventional one. Nevertheless, we 
must not rule out the possibility that new theorems or new explanatory principles may modify the reigning 
supremacy of this interpretation. 
 
1.- Introduction. 
Although the conventional interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism (CIQM), 
very close to the Copenhagen interpretation, is still dominant (is used in almost all textbooks), 
there are physical situations that ask for an interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism 
(QMF) in terms of the Statistical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (SIQM) or even for 
hidden variables theories (HVT). The SIQM and HVT are different research programs, but they 
are closely related, as we will see further below. To introduce properly the distinctions between 
the three previous acronyms we will ask an old and apparently simple question. Is the wave 
function associated to an individual system or to a statistical ensemble? A first tentative answer 
could be formulated as follows. QMF introduces probabilities, and probabilities are related to 
statistical ensembles. Otherwise, the same concept of probability would lose its meaning. In 
QM, if it is said that you would get some concrete result with 0,63 probability it means that if the 
experiment is carried out 100 times, that concrete result would appear approximately 63 times. 
Hence, the obvious answer will be that the wave function should be related with statistical 
ensembles. However, despite its intuitiveness this idea does not capture completely what we 
want to express. The real problem to analyze could be best introduced with the following 
example. Imagine that we prepare identically two radioactive atoms with half-life of 30 minutes.  
By preparation we understand all those theoretical methods and physical procedures 
necessary to fully characterize the state of the system. It is, thus, a macroscopic reproducible 
act that lefts the system, without destroying it, in a concrete state after the procedure. In 
quantum theory, this preparation is represented by a vector state (or a density matrix). 
Identically in this context will mean identity of procedures, that is that the experimenter has 
repeated all previous operations, so that there is no difference whatsoever between them. Note, 
however, that identical preparations are not necessarily followed by identical results, so there is 
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an important practical problem in guarantying that the state is the same after the preparation 
process.  
Identity, as we have used it here, is referred to the preparation procedures. However, in 
physics, the term identity is usually applied to entities, not to procedures. Two or more entities 
(or individuals) are identical if they have all their intrinsic properties in common (and 
reciprocally). Identical preparations do not imply necessarily identity of entities (see comment 
below). One interesting philosophical problem related to the previous distinction, which we will 
quote on passing, would be if individuation is lost in those circumstances or if we still can speak 
about “individuals”. This is an old philosophical problem with many facets. When in 1663 Leibniz 
attempted the synthesis of the arguments introduced by his predecessors in relation to the 
principle of individuation (Quillet, 1979), he took a position close to the nominalists. The reason 
was that he considered that only individuals existed and, moreover, that the division between 
two individuals is not a particular feature added to the constituents of the identity, but the 
expression of the differences between two complete set of those constituents. In other words, 
entities that share the whole set of features are indiscernibles, then identical. In physics all the 
particles (or individuals) of the same type, are identical. Electrons, neutrons, protons, etc., 
produced at different times and places of the universe have the same intrinsic properties (there 
are not errors in their manufacturing) and, therefore, they are truly identical. Swapping two of 
them in an ensemble changes nothing, except a possible sign. Being identical they still can be 
either distinguishable (in classical mechanics) or indistinguishable (in quantum mechanics)
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Let us go back to the radioactive case we were considering. Here the synchronic 
“indiscernibility of the identicals” would refer only to the preparation procedures and would 
resolve diachronically with time. A subsequent controlled experiment would reveal a differential 
property in the entities: the first would decay, for example, after 16 minutes, whilst the other 
would decay after 44 minutes, let us say. As we have already said, the identity of preparations 
do not lead either to the identity of the individuals, nor to the identity of the results. 
 The CIQM conceives these two atoms as identically prepared and adds that there is no 
explanation about why the outcomes are different, that is why one of them decays after 16 
minutes and the other after 44. Even more: it defends that such explanation does not exist. 
Consequently, from this point of view Leibniz’s converse principle of the indescernibility of 
identicals would in some way fail in the quantum domain. We would be in a situation in which, in 
the absence of a distinctive trait in the preparation, we would have a plurality of identical 
procedures referring to entities that nevertheless behave differently.  
On the other hand, the SIQM would maintain that if the decay takes place at different times 
it had to be because the preparation procedure does not give a homogeneous ensemble, an 
ensemble of objects ontically identical, but similar and that the two atoms must have, therefore, 
some differential intrinsic properties. This is close to the idea we want to explore, namely that 
statistical ensembles can be identically or similarly prepared and that the concept of identical 
preparation is related to the CIQM, while the concept of similar quantum-state preparation is 
connected with the SIQM and, perhaps, with HVT. This has other implications that we will 
disclose in what follows. 
Note that we are not dealing here with the related philosophical problem of identity and 
individuality already mentioned (French, 2011). We are dealing only with the problem of the 
meaning of the concept of preparation (identical or similar) and its consequences as far as the 
understanding of quantum formalism is concerned. Unlike the SIQM, where the referent of the 
state preparation is a statistical ensemble of microscopic objects, in the CIQM it is understood 
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 We have omitted in this brief digression the spatio-temporal properties. In classical mechanics all identical particles 
(atoms, molecules, electrons, etc.) are considered distinguishable by the different spatio-temporal properties (positions 
and velocities) that they may have at a given time. However, in quantum statistical mechanics it is postulated and well 
established experimentally that a particular type of identical particles may be indistinguishable from one another, as the 
different statistics shows. Classical statistics, based on the distinguishability of identicals by their spatio-temporal 
properties, is called Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics, while in quantum mechanics the indistinguishability of identicals may 
result in the Bose-Einstein or the Fermi-Dirac statistics.  
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that the state is a representation of the result of a preparation procedure, rather than an ontic 
description of microscopic objects. 
This article is addressed primarily to students and recent graduates in physics and 
philosophy, but we pretend it should be also of interests to a broader audience, including 
philosophers, physics teachers, historians of physics and scientists. It is organized as follows. 
First, we introduce briefly and schematically the difference between the two quoted 
interpretations from the point of view of the preparation process. Then, in part three, we discuss 
if the SIQM leads necessarily to HVT o not, and their relation with local realism. Finally, some 
conclusions are gathered. 
 
2. – Epistemic versus ontic preparation. 
For the purposes of this paper, the CIQM will be characterized by two different traits. The 
first aspect is that the quantum state ψ is a mathematical expression that represents the result 
of the preparation procedure, either of an individual system, or of an ensemble of systems 
composed by two, three… N, particles (if we recursively repeat the procedures). Loosely 
speaking, we could say that the state of the system ψ encodes relevant information about 
those degrees of freedom necessary to completely characterize the system in a defined 
experimental context. The second aspect, related with the first one, is the introduction of an 
arbitrary division line between what is considered the “observer” and which is considered the 
observed system. This is done by applying the formalism only to the system, but neither to the 
sources, nor to the apparatus that carry out the measurement (see below for a qualification). 
The preparing and measuring devices are usually described in terms of the operations that the 
technicians, that have previously calibrated them, “know how” to do to make the experiment. 
Naturally, this procedure splits the world in the two mentioned parts: the (state of the) system, to 
which quantum theory applies, and the rest of the world, in particular, the measurement 
apparatus, to which the theory does not apply. 
Although the previous description coincides more with Bohr’s particular approach (Scheibe, 
1973), historically there have been two different sensitivities to understand where to place this 
division line inside the supporters of this approach.  
a) The first sensitivity
2
 maintains that it is a matter of complete indifference where the 
separation line is situated. We have to put the line somewhere, but this is not really cause of 
concern as far as contradictions do not arise
3
. Quantum theory has the same meaning wherever 
we put the line on. Let us explain this point with one example. Imagine that a person in a 
laboratory is measuring the spin projection over some direction of a spin ½ particle with a Stern-
Gerlach device. For her, the particle is on one side of the division line and the Stern-Gerlach 
and herself, on the other. Suppose now that another person is watching what is going on in that 
laboratory through a video camera. This second person can legitimately consider that the 
complete laboratory, including the first person and her devices, is her system. Now the line has 
been shifted. The whole laboratory, including the first person, is on one side and her, the new 
observer, on the other. They are describing different systems. We would have a serious 
problem with quantum formalism if the first observer predicts with certainty spin up and the 
second one predicts with certainty, and for the same measurement direction, spin down. 
However, there would be any physical problem at all if the two observers always coincide in 
their predictions. This issue has been analyzed a few years ago and it has been found that, in 
fact, there is no contradiction at all: the shifting of the line is not indeed a problem in this sense. 
Unfortunately, lack of space does not allow us to deepening into this discussion. The interested 
reader should consult Peierls (Peierls, 1991) and Brun (Brun et al, 2002, and references 
therein).  
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 Related to the names of N. Bohr, M. Born, W. Heisenberg, W. Pauli and P. Dirac. 
3
This problem seems to have some interesting similarities with the proposal of the extended mind (Clarke and 
Chalmers, 1998. See also Menary, 2010). It is beyond the scope of this essay to develop this conjecture. 
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A different matter inside this variant is to establish who the subject that marks the 
aforementioned separation line is. We have just shown with the previous example that different 
observers can assign different state vectors (or wave functions) to the same system depending 
on the information they have. Consequently, the state vector (alternatively, the density matrix 
ρˆ ) seems to encode the information that an individual observer has about the result of an 
experimental process classically describable, understanding by this the contextual information 
about some degrees of freedom of the system. This allows two observers that have different 
information about a concrete experimental situation, to use different wave functions. This 
individual subjective understanding is strongly supported by many experiments carried out in 
the last twenty years, the experimental verification (Boschi et al., 1998) of the quantum 
teleportation protocol (Bennet et al, 1993) being one of them. What is teleported is the 
information acquired in the preparation that, conveniently applied to a distant system, 
reproduces the initial quantum state on that quantum system. As we have explained above, one 
of the implications of this point of view is that the division line is inevitably traced by some 
individual observer, and therefore, the observer necessarily must be taken into account: it 
cannot be eventually removed. This individual observer might be in a first instance a mechanical 
device, but in the end, there must be an interchangeable conscious observer able to register the 
result and to incorporate it to physics, to the cultural heritage. Undoubtedly, experiments have 
outcomes, but the outcomes lie outside quantum formalism. This is a crucial consequence of 
the quantum postulates whose transcendence, unfortunately, is often overlooked. To discuss it 
with detail lies outside the purposes of this article and the interested reader should consult 
Mittelstaed, 1998. What the QMF allows in general is to predict the outcomes with certain 
probability, and not to determine them through the interaction between the microscopic system 
and the measuring device. There is not such a physical description in the QMF. Quantum 
results are comprehended as real phenomena that cannot be reduced to physical processes, as 
is the case in the Lorentz contraction. They are “experienced objective realities”, whatever this 
would mean, and they should be considered as primitive non-explainable facts to be 
subsequently organized by the theory. This is the ultimate reason why the line is necessary.  
This individual observer plays thus the role of a transcendental subject, limited to the 
cognitive operation, and not the role of an aesthetic or ethical subject. In the sense we are 
speaking here, ontology is hardly dissociable from the theory of knowledge: it is the intervention 
of the transcendental subject what shapes the objectivity of things. This is the reason why the 
individual observer must “communicate to others what she has perceived and what she has 
learnt” (Bohr, 1958). Events known by nobody, are not part of physical science. This scrambling 
of realities and information (Jaynes, 2003) is perhaps the essential characteristic of this first 
variant of the conventional interpretation (the CIQM). 
b) The second sense or variant of this interpretation applies the formalism also to the 
devices but without any apparent separating line. Von Neumann first intended this bold step, 
which would restore a homogeneous account of the world based on the quantum principles, in 
1932 (von Neumann, 1955). However if we make this step, we could find ourselves trapped in 
the same situation we try to avoid by introducing the arbitrary line as a primitive concept. Let us 
explain briefly this point. If we apply the formalism to both, the system and the apparatus, the 
linearity of the theory has the consequence that the system and the measuring apparatus 
become entangled. This means that the joint state corresponds to a superposition of at least 
two empirically incompatible macroscopic possibilities. Both terms are present by virtue of the 
unitary evolution and no result will be produced. Technically, pure states evolve unitarily to pure 
states but to get a result we need one of the terms in a mixture. Entanglement is then only the 
precedent of what we call a measurement. In the entangled state, we still do not have a result. 
To get a result we need to determine which one of the two possibilities, let us say, is actualized 
by measuring. If we had an irreducible separating line, we could appeal to the classical 
character of the apparatus and decree that the pointer has always a definite position, as the first 
variant maintains. The position of the classical pointer selects only one term in the 
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superposition, and the problem disappears (by definition). As we have said, this is how Bohr 
solved it. However, if there were not a separating line, as required by those looking for a 
homogeneous account of the world, the problem would actually remain. A possible way out 
would be to extend the system with another observer that watches what is going on in the 
second laboratory, and them with another one, and so on (von Neumann’s chain), until you 
reach a point in which, to have the desired outcome, “something” must reduce the mentioned 
superposition, leaving only one term. What can be then this “something” that reduces the 
superposition to a single term producing a result? It cannot be anything physical, because, in 
that case, we could recursively apply again the argument. One possibility left is that, if we wish 
to have a coherent scheme, entities able to produce projections, should exist. The best 
candidates to do that action are an external God that intervenes on the universe (not an 
Aristotelian, but a Christian one) if the system is the whole universe, or, alternatively, the 
conscious mind of the observer (in all the other cases). The first alternative could be considered 
as a kind of “quantum ontological argument” for the existence of God and lies outside the 
objectives of this essay. The second introduces the mind-matter problem and, in this sense, 
also lies outside the objective of this essay. This alternative, with strong similarities with the 
previous one, corresponds, roughly speaking, to what has been called the von Neumann (v. 
Neumann, 1955), London-Bauer (London and Bauer, 1939) and Wigner (Wigner, 1967) 
interpretation.  
Note that this approach is not really different of the first mode above: there is only a shifting 
of the line, not a real elimination of it. The line has now an objective place: it will be always 
situated in the mind of at least one observer that perceives the result, a conscious observer that 
must, afterwards, communicate to others what she has learned. This communication process is 
not an irrelevant step, but absolutely necessary to incorporate that result to physical science.  
This interpretation, considered here as a second CIQM variant, and the Platonic (or the 
Cartesian) dualism introduced, is a fascinating subject by itself, more if we consider the 
proposals put forward in the last twenty years by researchers at the interface between 
consciousness and quantum theory (Stapp, 2001 and 2007). Textbooks combine these two 
understandings of QMF and this somewhat confusing mixing is usually called the conventional 
interpretation of QMF
4
. We think that it is possible to unify coherently these two interpretations 
(leaving aside any mystical connotation) if the emphasis is put in the two following aspects 
already mentioned. First, the state of the system should be related to the acquisition of 
contextual information that takes place in the preparation procedure. And second, the process 
of obtaining a result should be understood not as a physical process, but as an epistemological 
one, that is, as the acquisition of information by science, physics in this case. Unfortunately, 
lack of space does not allow us to develop more the coincidences and differences of these two 
variants and we leave it for a subsequent paper.  
The relevant conclusion for our purposes, to be to drawn from the previous comments, is 
that the association of the state vector (the density matrix) with identical preparation procedures 
should be related the conventional interpretation of the QMF and, as we have tried to show, it is 
inextricably linked to the so called measurement problem (Albert, 1994) (and perhaps to the 
problem of the conscious mind. See Rosemblum et al., 2006; Squires, 1990). 
On the other hand, in the SIQM it is considered that ψ  corresponds to the real state of an 
ensemble of microscopic objects. However, due to “practical inevitable circumstances”
5
, the 
preparation procedure of this state is always imperfect and thus the state vector must be related 
exclusively to (an ensemble of) similar prepared systems. In this interpretation, the state has an 
objective meaning and corresponds to the ensemble. For the SIQM, QMF remains silent as far 
as individual systems are concerned. It speaks exclusively about ontical statistical ensembles 
(Ballantine, 1970 and 1998), the statistical character of quantum mechanics being related to 
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 Some scholars call it “the shut up and calculate interpretation” (SUCI). 
5
 To prepare identically an ensemble of systems is considered here literally pure metaphysics. 
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incomplete information of the individuals. In the CIQM, the statistical character of the theory is 
however due to the essentially probabilistic nature of physical world itself.  
Note that, regardless of what we have argued, to contend that the two atoms are “really 
identical” is somehow going beyond the CIQM. As we have already said, the identity of the 
preparation procedures does not imply in any way the identity of the alleged entities. The 
reason is that the CIQM sees the theory as formulated in terms of knowledge, a philosophical 
combination of pragmatic (Rorty 1999) and structuralist (Ludwidg, 2008) elements. As it is well 
known, and Niels Bohr emphasized many times, the CIQM does not speak about ontic 
essences in any way, but about the result of our potential future interventions carried out in 
concrete experimental macroscopic contexts and about their mutual relationships. 
Although the conventional interpretation of QMF has been proved consistent and productive 
for the last 87 years, there are, however, situations in which not considering the quantum state 
as corresponding to a real quantum system puts strong pressures on our understanding of what 
is going on, pressures that will become evident with the following example. Let us consider an 
ethanol molecule
6
. If we ignore the spin, that is not relevant for our considerations, quantum 
theory tells us that the total angular momentum in the ground state of this molecule is equal to 
zero. What does it meant to say that the angular momentum of an ethanol molecule equals 
zero? Although this is a difficult problem that requires a complex technical treatment in which 
we cannot enter now, let us say that according to the CIQM, this means that the state has 
spherical symmetry. Now, if the state represents the knowledge we have about the preparation 
procedure of an individual system, what does it mean to say that this knowledge has spherical 
symmetry? Would it imply that one individual 
3 2CH  CH OH  molecule has spherical symmetry? 
A much more easy way to comprehend this symmetry would be to think that the wave 
function corresponds to a statistical ensemble of molecules similarly prepared, as the SIQM 
maintains. In one of these molecules, the axis that passes through the two carbon atoms, with 
black colour in the figure below, would point, for example, horizontally in relation with some 
arbitrary coordinate system; in other, would point at 45º; in another one at 31º; and so on, with 
an isotropic distribution. If that were the case, then it would be meaningful to say that the whole 
ensemble, the state referent for the SIQM, has spherical symmetry. However, as far as one 
individual molecule is concerned it is impossible to figure out that symmetry. The reason is 
made evident by looking at the figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Ethanol molecule. 
 
Two carbon atoms are located in the centre of two separated tetrahedra, inverted and joined at 
the vertices. The angle formed by the line that joins the two carbon atoms and the one that joins 
the oxygen with one of the carbon atoms, has been measured to be about 103º. It also has 
been measured with high precision other angles, the strength of the links between the different 
atoms, etc. To summarize: we experimentally know that the molecule has the structure 
modelled in figure 1. If we think, as the SIQM does, that QMF is formulated in terms of a 
“finished” objective reality
7
 and that the sate vector directly corresponds to this reality, it would 
not be possible to conceive the spherical symmetry of one individual molecule in any way. It has 
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 The water or carbon dioxide molecules could be other examples. The latter has the advantage that the three nuclei 
have spin zero and it is only necessary to justify the zero coupling of electron spins. 
7
 That is, with a well defined structure, properties, and so on. More concretely: finished in ontological classical terms.  
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no meaning at all. This is one the reasons why, in this interpretation, the referent of the quantum 
state is the ensemble. The counterpart is that, like in Aristotle, we only know things about 
ensembles; the individuals are not object of science. In brief, the ontic meaning of the quantum 
state defended by the SIQM is well founded experimentally. It could be understood as a 
physical object encoding all the properties of this molecule. However, practical limitations may 
prevent one from preparing identically the molecules such that when the preparation procedures 
are finished, what we get is an isotropically distributed ensemble. The spherical symmetry would 
be then easily understood if we associate the wave function with a conceptual Gibbs ensemble, 
and not with an individual ethanol molecule. In that case, the different individuals of that 
ensemble will not be identically, but similarly prepared, as the SIQM advocates. With an 
ensemble of identically prepared systems, it would not be symmetry. If they were identical, all 
axes should point in the same direction and the angular momentum will not be zero. 
Note that if QMF is formulated on terms of knowledge, as we have said the CIQM does, the 
alleged entities do not need to be identical. It is a dubious way out, because there is still an 
important problem remaining here. This interpretation would be yet in hard trouble for the 
reason that it is very difficult to escape the force of the experimental results in which the 
structure represented in this figure is based.  
If the individuals are similar but not identical, a new possibility not contemplated till now 
opens: it might be possible to introduce additional underlying variables able to explain the 
hypothetical differences between the individuals, giving therefore a deeper and more detailed 
picture of the world, perhaps a classical one. The theories aimed to introduce these variables, 
not contemplated in quantum formalism, are called hidden
8
 variables theories (HVT).  
Some scholars make an interesting distinction between the SIQM and the HVT perspective 
that is convenient to remember now. Both approaches have in common the idea that the wave 
function does not contain complete information about the individual quantum system, as 
Einstein pointed out many years ago, but about an ensemble of similarly prepared quantum 
systems. Despite this coincidence, some of the followers of the SIQM maintain that to introduce 
additional variables to complete QMF, describing so the individual system, is a step further and 
can be consider a matter of opinion. The reason is that even if the quantum mathematical 
description of the ethanol molecule were incomplete, it might have no meaning to introduce 
additional parameters, angles for example in this case giving the orientation of the molecule, 
because it could result in being absolutely useless. It may well happen that we will never be 
able to produce an ensemble of molecules, for whatever reasons, in such a way that all of them 
have their axis horizontal, let us say. That is, that they were identically prepared from the ontical 
point of view. It is indeed easy to argue in favour of this practical impossibility using QMF. It 
could happen that due to the Heisenberg principle, for example, any preparation that we attempt 
would result in a spherical distribution of the axis connecting the two carbon atoms. 
Alternatively, perhaps we could prepare identically all systems as far as one concrete 
observable is concerned, but not in relation to all, in particular the non-commuting ones. In this 
case, HVT would be useless in practice and, from this practical point of view, there is a big 
difference between the SIQM and (to believe in) the existence of HVT. Many scholars support 
the SIQM because they see it as the less problematic ontological interpretation of QMF, without 
considering important the problem of whether to introduce HV or not. In fact, many of them are 
against the introduction of hidden parameters or ontic properties. This strategy may be 
considered as a good “protective barrier” against the well-known failures of hidden variables 
theories, materialized in the so-called non-go theorems and their experimental verifications (see 
further bellow). To make the HV additional step we must be interested also in the question of if 
the HV could exist in principle and not only if it is convenient to introduce them in practice. We 
will discuss this concrete point in the next section. 
 
 
                                            
8
 Hidden for QMF. 
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3. – Determinism, SIQM, Hidden Variables and Local Realism. 
Although it is not our purpose to discuss now this issue at length, let us comment briefly 
that the problems previously considered are related also with determinism. QM is not a 
deterministic theory, as we have explained with the experiment with the two radioactive atoms. 
It does not predict when exactly an atom is going to decay. It only gives the average life. If 
somebody prefers, for philosophical or any other reasons, a deterministic theory she should 
specify things better, as to be able to predict in which instant a concrete atom is going to decay 
and in which direction the  -particle, let us say, will be emitted. This would be another important 
reason to declare QMF incomplete and to introduce additional parameters. Maybe Einstein had 
this idea in his head, we will never know. What we do know is that this determinism issue was 
not his main concern with QMF, but local realism that we will introduce now. In this essay, 
realism in the broad sense will mean that there is a material reality, and in the restricted sense, 
that this material reality is composed by separable objects that have dynamical non-contextual, 
ontic or intrinsic properties that individualizes them. Locality in the broad sense will mean that 
actions or influences cannot be propagated instantaneously and, in the restricted sense, that 
even if these hypothetical influences exist, they cannot be utilized to send messages at 
superluminal velocity (no signalling condition).  
To see better the implied connection between the CIQM, HVT, Local Realism and the 
SIQM, let us remember the example introduced by Einstein in the Solvay meeting (Solvay, 
1928). More elaborated, this example took him, jointly with Podolski and Rosen, to the famous 
EPR argument (EPR, 1935). 
Suppose that we have a radioactive atom in point C, the centre of the figure 2 below, and 
let us imagine that the total angular momentum of the atom is zero. The figure depicted 
represents an empty sphere whose interior is like a TV screen or a photographic film. If the 
atom emits an  -particle, we will see a sparkle afterwards in the screen or, alternatively, the film 
will record one event. QMF represents the relevant degrees of freedom of the  -particle, after 
the atom has decayed and before it reaches the screen, by a spherical wave. This  
                                                
            
                 Figure 2. Slight modification of Einstein’s gedankenexperiment of 1927. 
 
means that the amplitude of the wave in all radial directions is the same at the same distance of 
C. However, when the impact takes place and we see a flash on the screen, or a mark on the 
film, the wave function “jumps”, that is, the delocalized wave function, extended by the entire 
sphere, suddenly “reduces” to the point A in the figure, let us say. Here we have again the two 
different aforementioned possibilities, (already noted by Einstein at that time): 
 The first, adapted to our local realist classical intuitions, is to say that the particle has really 
gone from the centre to the point A, but given that our initial information was incomplete, 
perhaps due to an impossible perfect preparation, we didn’t know to which concrete point of the 
sphere the  -particle was going, and therefore we represent this incomplete information by a 
function with spherical symmetry. Note that if this realist understanding were applied to an 
individual case (CIQM) and not only to the ensemble (SIQM), the reduction would imply the 
instantaneous transmission of “something” physical, as Einstein remarked, because the function 
that differs from zero at points B or D, for example, suddenly becomes zero on them, when the 
C  
 
 
B 
 
A 
 
D 
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 -particle manifests itself only in point A. If the state vector were a real object corresponding to 
something more than mere knowledge or information, as it looks like when speaking about one 
material  -particle, and if we apply it to an individual systems, then there must be an 
instantaneous transmission that violates locality, in the broad sense that an influence has been 
propagated at a speed greater than the speed of light. Einstein concluded, then, that the wave 
function corresponds to the ensemble, not to the individual case. 
In the CIQM, a pragmatic approach, the wave function is not a physical object. What QMF 
does is to relate different observed physical phenomena, here the decay of the atom with the 
flash in the screen. We represent everything we know about the relevant degrees of freedom of 
the particle by a wave function, which allows us to calculate the probability that afterwards a 
flash will be produced in the point A of the screen or in any other point (SUCI). These 
predictions have been, till now, in perfect agreement with the experimental results, and for the 
purpose of doing science, they add, this is all we need.  
On the other hand, the SIQM would allow the following spatio-temporal explanation of the 
facts. There is a particle; the particle goes, indeed, one way or the other, but we cannot prepare 
it to the point of knowing which way it will go. Only, on the detection, we finally find out which 
way it has gone. In this explanation is not the case of any transmission at superluminal velocity. 
It only says that the preparation encoded in the state of the system does not represent the 
complete real state of things, due to the impossibility of making a preparation able to tell us the 
instant and direction in which the individual  -particle will be emitted. What we have is 
incomplete information due to this same impossibility.  
HVT would be a step further from this, and it would respond to the desire of having a 
stronger link with material reality, embodied in a causal, deterministic and spatiotemporal 
description of processes in the microscopic domain. Causality in this concrete example should 
be understood as related to the conservation principles. It would mean that if the  -particle is 
not subject to any potential, it will maintain its initial momentum. The spatiotemporal description 
would tell us the different positions by which the  -particle has passed through, so that the 
place where the impact occurs is determined. This image seems to be a very natural desire.  
Alternatively, the CIQM would tell us that position and momentum are conjugated variables 
in quantum formalism, and they cannot be defined at the same time. We retroactively could, 
once we know the point on the screen, calculate them, but this knowledge is useless for the 
purpose of making new predictions (Heisenberg, 1930). As in many other experiments, we can 
indeed reconstruct the past, a very relevant epistemological issue, but this knowledge cannot 
help us to make further predictions about the point in which the next  -particle will impinge. So, 
although QMF allow us to reconstruct the past depending on the operations we choose to make 
now, it refers to the future, to an open probabilistic future. Deterministic local hidden variables 
theories (LHVT), and the related local realism, aims at a description that quantum formalism 
does not allow, they would conclude.  
That being said, it is easy to understand why the adherents to local realism would be in 
favour of the existence of hidden parameters and of the SIQM. We have already commented 
that if all that can be predicted is given by quantum formalism, the purpose of introducing LHV is 
not so clear. Let us insist in this idea with the example of the radioactive atom. With a LHVT, we 
would aim at building up a new theory able to tell us, for example, in which precise moment 
each atom is going to decay. This theory would be useful if and only if we were able to prepare 
an atom that would decay after any desired time interval. But we do not know how to do that 
and perhaps we will never know. All we can do is to prepare the atom, and then it will decay 
whenever it wants, so to speak. There is only one doubt in this scenario that we want to 
remember now. Maybe, if we had such a theory, we would be able to prepare it. That is, it could 
happen that the same new theory would give us also enough information about how to make 
the preparation procedure. At the present state of our knowledge, we don’t know how to do that. 
And if we cannot control the preparation, we cannot look for a better relation between the 
preparation and the measurement result. Nevertheless, it is not possible to advance, before 
10 
 
building up a theory, if it is going to be fruitful or not. After Popper (Popper, 1934) it is widely 
admitted that what can be possibly measured is in many cases determined or at least 
conditioned by the very theory. It is the theory what will tell us what is measurable and what is 
not. Remember, for example, the motion of Brownian particles. The relevant magnitude to be 
measured was not the velocity, as it was thought at that time, but the diffusion coefficient. 
However, this fact was unknown until Einstein published his theory about the Brownian motion 
in 1905. 
We have motivated sufficiently the reasonability of opting for a SIQM in intuitive “difficult” 
cases. We have also explained the intimate relation between the SIQM, LHVT and local 
realism. Also the advantage of introducing HVT for understanding what is going on in the 
microscopic domain. From the ontological point of view, it would be an excellent solution to the 
most important foundational quantum troubles. However, as it is well known, the problem is that 
the more attractive hidden variables theories to reach such objective, the local ones, are 
incompatible with the predictions of quantum formalism. The mere fact of its existence implies 
that some statistical predictions of QM must be false. To renounce to one of the best theories 
ever constructed by humankind, is not an acceptable option for the physicist’s community
9
. The 
demonstration of this adverse turn of the destiny is known as “the non-go theorems of HVT”. As 
it is not the main purpose of this paper, we will only quote them for completeness, referring to 
the interested reader to some excellent papers published on this issue (see for example, 
Mermin, 1993). The first one, and the more famous, is the von Neumann theorem, introduced in 
his book on 1932 (von Neumann, 1955). Von Neumann’s ban was transgressed by D. Bohm 
(Bohm, 1952), when he was able to produce a HVT that, supposedly, reproduces all the 
predictions of QMF at the, for many, undesirable price of contextuality and non locality. Bohm’s 
theory reactivated the discussion on the possibility of HVT and his work was followed by the 
works of Gleason (Gleason, 1957); Bell in 1964 and 1966 (Bell, 1987); Kochen and Specker 
(Kochen-Specker, 1967); Jauch and Piron (Jauch-Piron,1967), etc. All of them introduced non-
go theorems, based on hypothesis less restrictive than the von Neumann’s ones, that preclude 
the more attractive HVT (the non-contextual and the local ones) and, paradoxically, weakened 
the SIQM, the ontic inclined interpretation of the quantum state that historically provided the 
conceptual basis which supports those HVT. The best solution to the foundational problems of 
the theory is so theoretically and experimentally blocked
10
, and we have to look in a contextual 
and non-local direction to solve them (Bohm’s theory). 
 
4. Conclusions. 
In this article we have highlighted the relevance of the concept of the preparation procedure 
to show the basic differences between the statistical and the conventional interpretations of 
quantum formalism. The results of our discussions are now summarized. 
In the conventional interpretation of QMF it makes sense to speak about identical 
preparation procedures, but that does not imply the preparation of identical entities. In fact, as 
the theory is formulated in terms of knowledge, we should not really talk about entities at all, but 
only about relationships between observed phenomena. Consequently, the quantum state ψ
 
is 
seen as containing information about the result of the preparation procedure.  
There are many instances in this interpretation in which the recourse to the projection 
postulate is inevitable. These projections do not need and do not have any physical description. 
They are not physical processes but epistemic ones. Due to this fact, some scholars maintain 
that Quantum Mechanics so understood is not a physical theory, a very strong claim, indeed. 
Their main argument is based on the idea that a physical theory must provide an explanation of 
the measurement outcomes, based on the physical interaction between the microscopic system 
and measuring apparatus. That is, it must explain why the device’s needle points, for example, 
                                            
9
 To make this risky step we need a really strong motivation like, for example, finding an internal contradiction between 
their postulates. 
10
 Except closing the two remaining loopholes (locality and fair-sampling) in one and the same experiment. 
11 
 
to 1 and no to other number. Quantum formalism does not allow obtaining an outcome 
(Mittelstaed, 1998) and therefore it is not, in their opinion, a physical theory. For them, Bohm’s 
Mechanics or the Collapse Theories (Ghirardi, 2011), close to the SIQM, are physical theories. 
This strong opinion is not shared by the overwhelming majority of the scientific community, 
which firmly believes that the CIQM constitutes an excellent physical theory experimentally 
contrasted up to a level unprecedented in the history of science. 
Meanwhile, in the SIQM, it makes no sense to speak of the identical preparation procedures 
of the entities that make up an ensemble. All that can be done in practice are similar 
preparations. The entities that make up the ensemble, always kept irreducible differences 
between them. The quantum state ψ is thus a real object corresponding to an ensemble of 
similarly prepared microscopic objects, inside which the individuals maintain irreducible 
differences between them. The experimental reasons of these differences are not clear, but the 
ansatz is that the preparation cannot be made empirically complete to eliminate them. The 
profound physical reason why this is so is an open question. The projection postulate is now 
understood as the selection of the corresponding sub ensemble. If carried through to its ultimate 
consequences, the SIQM will be doomed to introduce hidden variables. HV theories maintain 
that it has conceptual meaning to introduce in principle new ontic parameters beyond the 
quantum formalism to explain the differences between the hypothetical sub ensembles (of the 
SIQM). Once the allegedly extended theory had been built up, it may happen that this new 
theory will tell us if the intended preparation can be really done. However, for some of its 
supporters, if the hypothetical hidden variables cannot be empirically controlled, it has no sense 
to introduce them, at least from the practical point of view. 
The ontic understanding of the formalism (SIQM and its logical consequence LHVT) has a 
great intuitive appeal because it possesses fewer ontological difficulties. However, many 
experimental results of the last 20 years carried out with systems that enter into the apparatus 
one by one, recently recognized with the 2012 Nobel Prize in Physics, jointly with some 
theoretical developments of quantum information theory seem to be in favour of the epistemic 
approach
11
. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that new theorems or new 
explanatory principles may modify the current pre-eminence of the conventional interpretation, 
but it seems improbable that these future advances may incline the balance towards the 
statistical alternative. 
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